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Two More Ways Not to Think about Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment
DavidAlan Sklanskyt
This Essay challenges two increasingly common ideas about privacy and the
Fourth Amendment. The first is that any protections needed against government
infringements on privacy in the information age are best developed outside the
courts and outside constitutional law. The second is that the various puzzles encountered when thinking about privacy and the Fourth Amendment can be solved
or circumvented through some kind of invocation of the past: a focus on the text of
the FourthAmendment; the study of its history; or an effort to preserve the amount
of privacy that used to exist, either when the FourthAmendment was adopted or at
some laterpoint.

Fourth Amendment law is famously controversial, but for
much of the past half century there was rough consensus about
three things: first, the constitutional ban on "unreasonable
searches and seizures" is aimed chiefly at protecting privacy;
second, courts should take the lead in protecting privacy against
new methods of surveillance; and third, the kind of privacy the
Fourth Amendment should defend is the kind of privacy needed
to keep a modern society free and democratic. That consensus
has unraveled, for reasons I explore in a separate article.' That
article takes issue with two increasingly common ideas about
the Fourth Amendment and privacy: that the Fourth Amendment actually should be anchored in concerns other than privacy; and that, to the extent search-and-seizure law remains focused on privacy, privacy should be understood to consist of the
ability to control the dissemination and use of information.2
Here, I want to challenge two other increasingly common
ideas about privacy and the Fourth Amendment. The first is
that any protections needed against government infringements

t Professor, Stanford Law School. I thank Orin Kerr, Erin Murphy, and participants at the 2014 University of Chicago Law Review symposium for comments and criticism, as well as Hamilton Jordan Jr and Masao MacMaster for research assistance.
1 David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think about Privacy
and the FourthAmendment, 102 Cal L Rev 1069 (2014).
See id at 1073-74.
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on privacy in the information age are best developed outside the
courts and outside constitutional law. The second is that the
various puzzles encountered when thinking about privacy and
the Fourth Amendment can be solved or circumvented through
some kind of invocation of the past: a focus on the text of the
Fourth Amendment; the study of its history; or an effort to preserve the "degree of privacy against government" that used to
exist, either "when the Fourth Amendment was adopted" or at
3
some later point.
Variants of both these ideas have been advanced with particular clarity and influence by Professor Orin Kerr, a scholar I
greatly admire. As I will disagree with Kerr frequently in this
Essay, I want to make explicit at the outset what should be obvious: I will be singling out Kerr's arguments for criticism not
because I think they are especially feeble but, on the contrary,
because they constitute unusually thoughtful and fair-minded
versions of the positions I want to contest.
I. PRIVACY AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

The first idea I want to challenge here-that privacy protections are best developed by the political branches, without reliance on constitutional law-is a reaction against what has often
been a myopic focus on constitutional adjudication as the beginning and end of criminal procedure. That tendency was especially strong during the Warren Court era and its aftermath, but it
can still be seen today in a good deal of legal scholarship. So it is
a healthy correction to draw attention to the ways that legislatures and regulatory agencies guard against invasions of privacy. But the correction can go too far.
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit had to decide whether the
Fourth Amendment protected against the interception of radio
signals sent out by the handset of a cordless telephone. 4 Using a
radio receiver to eavesdrop on a cordless-telephone conversation
requires a warrant under the federal wiretapping statute, Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 5
but that requirement was not imposed until 1994.6 The Fourth
Circuit case involved warrantless surveillance carried out before
3
United States v Jones, 132 S Ct 945, 950 (2012), quoting Kyllo v United States,
533 US 27, 34 (2001).
4
See In re Askin, 47 F3d 100, 101-02 (4th Cir 1995).
5 Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 197, 211-25, codified at 18 USC §§ 2510-20.
6
Askin, 47 F3d at 102-03.
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then, when Title III expressly did not apply to the interception of
radio signals transmitted by a cordless telephone.7 So the case
squarely presented the question whether the surveillance counted as a search under the Fourth Amendment and therefore presumptively required a warrant.8
There was a decent argument that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply. First-generation cordless phones used radio frequencies that could be picked up by an ordinary AM/FM receiver, so perhaps anyone using such a phone lacked a "reasonable
expectation of privacy"-the sine qua non for a search under
Katz v United States.9 Other courts had deemed cordlesstelephone conversations constitutionally unprotected for precisely this reason,10 and the ease of interception was also why
Congress initially directed that eavesdropping on a cordless telephone did not require a Title III warrant." (Congress reversed
course in 1994 in part, apparently, because cordless telephones
had become harder to intercept, but mainly because the devices
had become much more common.)12 The Fourth Circuit, too,
noted how easily calls on early cordless telephones could be monitored, but it did not rely on this consideration alone in denying
Fourth Amendment protection to the captured conversations.13
Writing for the court, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III reasoned that judges should defer heavily to legislators in crafting
privacy protections for new communication technologies. 14 Drawing lines in this "fast-developing area," he explained, "requires
precisely the type of expertise that courts are institutionally illequipped to acquire and to apply."'15 Accordingly, "[als new
technologies continue to appear in the marketplace and outpace
existing surveillance law, the primary job of evaluating their
impact on privacy rights and of updating the law must remain

Id at 103.
See id at 105-06.
9 389 US 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan concurring).
10 See, for example, State v Delaurier,488 A2d 688, 694 (RI 1985); State v Howard,
679 P2d 197, 198-99, 206 (Kan 1984).
11 See, for example, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, S Rep No 99-541, 99th
Cong, 2d Sess 12 (1986). See also Adam P. Mastroleo, Note, Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect Cordless Telephone Communications, and If So, When?, 56 Syracuse L Rev 459,
465 (2006).
12 See Mastroleo, Note, 56 Syracuse L Rev at 466 (cited in note 11).
13 See Askin, 47 F3d at 105-06.
14 See id.
15 Id.
7
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with ... the legislature,"16 and "courts should be cautious not to
wield the amorphous 'reasonable expectation of privacy' standard ... in a manner that nullifies the balance between privacy
rights and law enforcement needs struck by Congress."'17
A decade later, Professor Kerr picked up and elaborated
Judge Wilkinson's argument. For two different reasons, Kerr
suggested, legislatures are much better than courts at devising
rules for new technologies.18 First, legislatures have good ways
to inform themselves about new technologies; courts do not. 19
Second, statutes can be amended to adapt to new realities or to
test alternative regulatory strategies; judicially created rules
lack this kind of flexibility.20 As a consequence, "legislative rulecreation offers significantly better prospects for the generation of
balanced, nuanced, and effective investigative rules involving
new technologies," and "courts should proceed cautiously and
with humility" in this area21-just as Wilkinson suggested.
The idea that new technological threats to privacy are best
addressed by legislatures rather than by courts recently picked
up four new endorsements, from Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Kagan. Concurring
separately in United States v Jones,22 the GPS-monitoring case,
Alito agreed with Kerr that, "[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns
may be legislative," because "[a] legislative body is well situated
to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way."23
Alito also endorsed Kerr's suggestion that the history of protections against wiretapping demonstrates the superiority of legislatures in crafting privacy protections for new technologies.24
And two years later, when the Court ruled in Riley v California25
that the police generally need a warrant to search an arrestee's

Id at 106.
Askin, 47 F 3d at 105-06.
See Orin S. Kerr, The FourthAmendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich L Rev 801, 858-59 (2004).
19 See id at 875-76, 881-82.
20 See id at 871.
21 Id at 859.
22 132 S Ct 945 (2012).
23 Id at 964 (Alito concurring), citing Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 805-06 (cited in
note 18).
24 See Jones, 132 S Ct at 964 (Alito concurring).
25 134 S Ct 2473 (2014).
16
17
18
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cell phone,26 Alito again concurred separately (this time by himself) and suggested that cell phone searches, too, are an issue
that legislatures are better suited to address.27 Wilkinson's suggestion has become a full-fledged meme, and it may be approaching the status of conventional wisdom.
It is far from clear, though, that legislatures really are better than courts at fashioning privacy rules for new technologies-or even that this is a sensible comparison to draw. Legislatures have advantages over courts, but it works the other way
too. True, legislative hearings take a broader, more systemic
view than hearings in a court case.2 8 Judicial hearings are by
their nature adversarial, though, which assures at least some
representation for both sides, whereas legislative hearings on
privacy issues in criminal investigations can easily be dominated by law enforcement interests. And while statutes theoretically can be revised at any time, without waiting for the proper
case to arise and without regard for precedent, in practice Congress is often notoriously sluggish. The case-by-case method of
decisionmaking can prompt reconsideration of rules that legislatures would never get around to amending.29 Surveying the
regulation of law enforcement practices by federal statutes, Professor Erin Murphy finds: (1) "Congress does less leading and
much more following when it comes to regulating privacy";30 (2)
"law enforcement ... plays a critical role in shaping" statutory
protections of privacy through its "clear and constant voice in
the political process"; 31 and (3) while privacy statutes are sometimes amended, Congress often has proven unwilling or unable

26

Id at 2493.

See id at 2497-98 (Alito concurring).
See Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 875 (cited in note 11).
29 See Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and
Security 165-67 (Yale 2011). Professor Daniel Solove concludes that, "[i]f anything, the
historical record suggests that Congress is actually far worse than the courts in reacting
to new technologies." Id at 167. He explains:
27

28

Federal legislation is not easy to pass, and it usually takes a dramatic event to
spark interest in creating or updating a law. In contrast, courts must get involved every time an issue arises in a case. As a result, issues are likely to be
addressed with more frequency in the courts than in Congress.
Id.
30 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111
Mich L Rev 485, 498 (2013).
31 Id at 503, 535.
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to correct "obviously flawed and outdated provisions."32 In fact,
Murphy concludes, many of the most successful privacy statutes
have stayed current "largely because of vague terms that can be
adapted
by
judicial
officials
to
apply
to
changed
circumstances."33
Generalizing from this last observation, Murphy suggests
that neither Congress nor the courts should "assume sole or
even primary responsibility for regulating privacy."34 Instead,
she suggests that sensible protections for privacy are most likely
to emerge from a collaborative process of "interbranch dialogue."6 As Murphy points out, the rules regulating wiretapping
emerged from precisely that kind of process. 3 6 In the 1920s,
wiretapping was statutorily prohibited in many states and
banned as a matter of policy by federal investigative agencies,
but after the Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution
permitted the use of wiretap evidence in criminal prosecutions, 37
the Prohibition Bureau openly embraced the practice.38 The
Court slowly backtracked, first by creatively reading a ban on
wiretap evidence into a federal statute that in fact said nothing
about the admissibility of intercepted conversations,39 and
then-when Congress did not cry foul-by narrowing the scope
of the earlier constitutional holding.40 Eventually, the Court
struck a compromise: electronic eavesdropping was constitutionally permissible, but only with a warrant based on a showing of
probable cause. 41 That compromise followed the pattern set by
many state statutes, 42 and it triggered, in turn, federal legislation along the same lines. 4s Congress later extended the scope of

Id at 533.
33 Id at 533-34. See also id at 536.
34 Murphy, 111 Mich L Rev at 537 (cited in note 30).
32

35

Id at 538.

36 See id at 493-94, 538. See also David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure,119 Harv L Rev F 56, 59-60 (2006).
37 See Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 465-67, 469 (1928).
38 See Walter F. Murphy, Wiretapping on Trial: A Case Study in the JudicialProcess 13, 125-29 (Random House 1965).
39 See Nardone v United States, 302 US 379, 381-83 (1937). See also Nardone v
United States, 308 US 338, 339 (1939).
40 See Silverman v United States, 365 US 505, 507-09 (1961).
41 Katz, 389 US at 358-59.
42 See Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 846 (cited in note 18) (indicating that, by 1967,
"[tihirty-six states had banned wiretapping' and "twenty-seven [states] allowed some
type of 'authorized' wiretapping).
43 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 82 Stat at 211-25, codified at
18 USC §§ 2510-20.
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the Court's compromise, requiring warrants for foreignintelligence wiretaps of US citizens 44 and, eventually, for interception of calls made on cordless telephones. 45 This history does
not demonstrate, as Alito has claimed, that "the regulation of
wiretapping was a matter better left for Congress."46 Instead, it
suggests that legal restrictions on wiretapping benefited from
the participation of both courts and legislatures.47
It is therefore to Alito's credit that he has recognized, ultimately, that courts do have a role to play in regulating privacy
threats from new technologies, at least when legislatures fail to
act. In Jones, for example, Alito concluded that, since "Congress
and most States have not enacted statutes regulating the use of
GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes," the
Court had little choice but "to apply existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person
would not have anticipated."48 In Riley, Alito suggested he would
defer to a "reasonable" legislative balancing of law enforcement
interests and the privacy interests of cell phone owners, but
since legislators had not acted, he joined the Court in requiring
a warrant before a cell phone was searched incident to an
arrest.49
Kerr takes a harder line. He argues that courts should not
just defer to legislative determinations about the best way to
protect privacy from new technologies; even when legislatures
have not acted, Kerr suggests that courts should hesitate to step
in for fear of taking the wind out of the legislature's sails. "The
absence of judicial regulation invites legislative action," he explains.50 Conversely, judicial efforts to protect privacy can

44 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub L No 95-511, 92
Stat 1783, 1787, codified at 50 USC § 1802(b).
45 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) § 202, Pub L
No 103-414, 108 Stat 4279, 4290-91 (1994), codified at 18 USC §§ 2510-11.
46 Jones, 132 S Ct at 963 (Alito concurring). See also Riley, 134 S Ct at 2497 (Alito
concurring) (suggesting that "electronic surveillance has been governed primarily" by
federal legislation rather than by the Supreme Court).
47 Much of this paragraph is adapted from Sklansky, 119 Harv L Rev F at 60 (cited
in note 36).
48 Jones, 132 S Ct at 964 (Alito concurring).
49 Riley, 134 S Ct at 2497 (Alito concurring).
50 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich L Rev 311,
350 (2012).
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"discourage legislative action by fostering a sense that the courts
have occupied the field."'51
Is judicial restraint the best way to encourage legislative action to protect privacy? It's a plausible claim,52 but the evidence
is thin. We lack good examples of Congress stepping in to regulate a technological threat to privacy that the Court has left entirely unaddressed. 53 Wiretapping is not an example of that, as
Murphy explains.54 Searching for another example, Kerr and
others have pointed at times to the statutory regulation of pen
registers.55 But the pen register statute turns out to be a case
study in the hazards of leaving privacy protection to Congress.
A pen register records the numbers called from a particular
telephone line. It is the opposite of a "trap-and-trace device,"
which records the numbers associated with incoming calls. Federal law prohibits installing or using a pen register or trap-andtrace device without a court order.56 As Kerr points out, this
Id.
See David A. Sklansky, Proposition 187 and the Ghost of James Bradley Thayer,
17 Chicano-Latino L Rev 24, 31-32 (1995).
53 Nor, for that matter, are there good examples of legislatures stepping in to regulate nontechnological threats to privacy about which constitutional law is largely silentthe use of confidential informants, for example.
54 See Murphy, 111 Mich L Rev at 538-39 (cited in note 30).
55 See, for example, Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 855 & 886 n 509 (cited in note 18);
Kerr, 111 Mich L Rev at 350-51 (cited in note 50); Jen Manso, Cell-Site Location Data
and the Right to Privacy, 27 Syracuse J Sci & Tech L 1, 21 n 102 (2012); Richard C. Worf,
The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23
Touro L Rev 93, 133 (2007). Kerr also cites federal statutes protecting, for example, the
privacy of bank records and journalists' records. See Kerr, 111 Mich L Rev at 350 (cited
in note 50); Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 856 (cited in note 18). But these are not examples of
Congress regulating new technological threats left unaddressed by the courts. They are
better described as gap-filling measures that provide heightened protection for particular
categories of information. The protections provided to e-mail and other stored electronic
communications may be better examples of Congress acting without judicial prodding to
protect against new technological threats to privacy. See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to
the Stored CommunicationsAct, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo Wash L
Rev 1208, 1209-18 (2004). But those protections were enacted against the backdrop of
Katz's broad principle that the Fourth Amendment protects "reasonable expectations of
privacy" in telecommunications, and even then they likely would not have been adopted
without industry pressure. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Hearings on HR
3378 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary,99th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1985) (statement of
Representative Robert Kastenmeier). Moreover, as Kerr points out, although the statutory protections for stored electronic communications are now "widely perceived as outdated," the revisions that Congress has so far considered "mostly nibble at the edges."
Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U Pa L Rev 373,
375 (2014). See also id at 386 ("[lIt has become commonplace to recognize that ECPA is
outdated.").
56 18 USC § 3121(a).
51

52
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prohibition is entirely statutory, and it was enacted after the
Supreme Court held that pen registers and trap-and-trace de57
vices are unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.
The pen register statute is also notoriously undemanding.
All that a prosecutor needs to do to secure judicial authorization
for a pen register or trap-and-trace device is to certify "that the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."8 No proof or explanation is needed, just the
government's say-so. And once the certification is made, issuance of the order is automatic; the court has no discretion to deny the application. 59 This doesn't sound like a regime aimed at
protecting privacy. It sounds like a regime designed to get the
government the information it wants while giving legal cover to
telecommunication companies.
And, in fact, the legislative history of the pen register statute makes clear that it had precisely this purpose. The Supreme
Court's pen register case, Smith v Maryland,60 was decided in
1979. Later the same year, at least two bills were introduced to
bring pen registers within the ambit of Title III-that is, to require the same kind of warrants for pen registers that were
needed for wiretaps.61 Neither bill went anywhere. Early the
next year, legislation was introduced to condition the use of pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices on a judicial finding of "reasonable cause" that the proposed surveillance would uncover evidence of criminal activity.62 This bill, too, went nowhere. Other
bills were introduced over the following years to regulate pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices.63 All foundered.
See Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 742, 746 (1979).
58 18 USC § 3122(b)(2). The certification can also come from a state lawenforcement officer. 18 USC § 3122(a)(2).
59 18 USC § 3123(a)(1)-(2).
60 442 US 735 (1979).
61 See S 1207, 96th Cong, 1st Sess, in 125 Cong Rec 22668 (Aug 3, 1979) (statement
of Senator Carl Levin); HR 5285, 96th Cong, 1st Sess, in 125 Cong Rec 25955 (Sept 24,
1979) (statement of Representative Robert Drinan).
62 See HR 933, 97th Cong, 1st Sess, in 127 Cong Rec 514, 518 (Jan 19, 1981)
(statement of Representative Ted Weiss). Alternatively, the bill provided that telephonetoll records could be accessed by subpoena, but if they were then the telephone customer
would need to be notified and given an opportunity to challenge the request in court.
See id.
63 See, for example, Criminal Code Revision Act of 1981, HR 1647, 97th Cong, 1st
Sess 297-98 (Feb 4, 1981) (barring installation or use of a pen register without a judicial
finding of "reason for the belief' that the information obtained would be "relevant to a
legitimate criminal or civil investigation"); Electronic SurveillanceAct of 1984, HR 6343,
98th Cong, 2d Sess 5-6 (Oct 1, 1984).
57
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Nonetheless, federal prosecutors routinely obtained court
orders when asking the telephone company (or, after 1982, any
of the new telephone companies) to provide records of outgoing
or incoming calls. The government followed this practice because
telephone companies wanted the legal protection provided by a
court order. As a telephone-company lawyer later recalled:
After Smith v. Maryland was decided, the question was graciously raised by law enforcement, would we be interested
in cooperating in Pen Register situations without a court
order. And our answer was no. And we do request a court
order for that, even though it may be legally permissible to
voluntarily undertake rendering such assistance.64
A federal magistrate judge familiar with these orders explained
in congressional testimony that they were "intended simply to
protect the telephone company and to enable the Government
authorities to obtain the assistance of the phone company. ''s
In 1985, when the Electronic Communications Privacy Act66
(ECPA) was first introduced,67 it conditioned the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices on judicial findings of "reasonable cause," the same standard that had been proposed unsuccessfully in 1979.68 Federal prosecutors objected strongly to this
proposal, arguing that it would "severely limit the effectiveness
of pen registers" and "create serious problems for law enforcement."69 All that should be required for a pen register, the DOJ
explained, is a prosecutor's representation that the information
64 Hearing on Privacy in Electronic Communications before the Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong, 2d Sess 12 (1984) ("1984 Privacy Hearings") (statement of H.W. William Caming,
Senior Counsel, AT&T). The successor companies to AT&T apparently followed the same
policy. See id.
65 1984: Civil Liberties and the National Security State, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 150 (1984) (testimony of US Magistrate
Judge James Carr).
66 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848,
codified in various sections of Title 18.
67 Electronic Communication Privacy, Hearing on S 1667 before the Subcommittee
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Committee on the Judiciary,99th Cong,
1st Sess 4-31 (Nov 13, 1985) ("ECP Hearing").
68 See text accompanying note 61.
69 ECP Hearing at 46-47 (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James
Knapp). See also, for example, Letter from Mary C. Lawton, Counsel for Intelligence
Policy, US DOJ (May 20, 1985), in Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Hearings on
HR 3378 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justiceof the House Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong, 1st & 2d Sess 484, 494.
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obtained would be relevant to a criminal investigation.70 The bill
was amended in accordance with the DOJ's wishes.71 Enacted in
1986, ECPA simply codified the preexisting practices that federal prosecutors had worked out with the telecommunications industry. The statute authorized-and in fact required-the issuance of a pen register or trap-and-trace order based solely on a
prosecutor's assertion that the requested surveillance would be
"relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation"-the key statutory language that has persisted to this day.72
The result of leaving regulation of pen registers and trapand-trace records to Congress has not been just that these tools
have gone essentially unregulated. The statutory treatment of
pen registers has served as a model for the statutory treatment
of metadata surveillance-for example, the collection and monitoring of routing information in e-mails and text messages, and
the wholesale archiving of the kind of telephone records that pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices previously collected much
more selectively. Metadata surveillance has expanded explosively over the past two decades, with only weak restrictions7 3 If
Smith invited legislative action, it is not an invitation that
generated a meaningful response.

II.

PRIVACY AND THE PAST

The other idea I want to challenge here is that the privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment can best be gauged by an
appeal to the past: to the language of the Amendment, to its history, or-a suggestion made with increasing frequency-to the
amount of privacy people used to have. Each of these approaches
promises to make search-and-seizure law more determinate and
less dependent on judicial whim. They have the additional
attraction, for scholars, of giving central importance to something enjoyable to research. But they are blind alleys.
The opening clause of the Fourth Amendment could hardly
be more open-ended. It protects "[t]he right of the people to be

70 See ECP Hearing, 99th Cong, 1st Sess at 58 (cited in note 69) (prepared statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James Knapp).
71 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-647, 99th
Cong, 2d Sess 30-31 (1986).
72
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 3122(b)(2), Pub L No 99-508,
100 Stat 1869,codified at 18 USC § 3122(b)(2).
73 See, for example, Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment,
128 Harv L Rev 691, 697-98 (2014).
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secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 74 One can perhaps extract
from this language the traditional rule exempting searches of
open fields from constitutional protection, 75 but not much else.
The second clause of the Fourth Amendment bans general
warrants, and the first clause could be read simply as a roundabout way of saying what the second clause says explicitly,76 but
that is a strained interpretation. 77 Alternatively, the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" could be read as a term of art
for searches prohibited at common law, but that, too, is an awkward reading with little to recommend it. 7 8 By far the most
straightforward interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is:
don't search or seize people, their homes, their writings, or their
stuff in ways that are excessive or unjustified, and in particular
79
don't issue any general warrants.
That interpretation poses a challenge, though, which is to
figure out what makes a search or seizure excessive or unjustified. One possible approach is to try to determine what kinds of
searches and seizures were thought "unreasonable" by some
group of people associated with the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment: its drafters or its advocates or the people who voted for it.80 The problems with this approach (aside from deciding
whose views should count) are well-known, although they bear
repeating. First, the search-and-seizure practices that generate
controversy today usually lack any close parallels in the late
eighteenth century, not just because technology has advanced
but because institutional and social contexts have changed too.
The Framers didn't know about GPS, obviously, but neither
were they familiar with modern police departments,81 let alone
the NSA or "crimmigration." Second, it's not clear why we

US Const Amend IV.
See Oliver v United States, 466 US 170, 181-84 (1984); Hester v United States,
265 US 57, 59 (1924).
76 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich L
Rev 547, 692-93, 736 (1999).
77
See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum L
Rev 1739, 1779 n 248 (2000).
78 For an extended argument, see id at 1774-1813.
79 Regarding the meaning of the term "unreasonable" in the late eighteenth century, see id at 1780-81.
80 See, for example, Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 693-724 (cited in note 76).
81 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 18501940, 62 Rutgers L Rev 447, 449-59 (2010); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts about
FirstPrinciples, 107 Harv L Rev 820, 830-38 (1994).
74
75
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should feel bound by eighteenth-century judgments about which
particular searches and seizures are unreasonable,82 or even
whether that is what the Framers or adopters of the Fourth
Amendment would have wanted or anticipated.83
Partly to avoid these difficulties, a different way is sometimes suggested to anchor the Fourth Amendment in the past.
Instead of banning particular practices that were thought unreasonable in the eighteenth century, the Fourth Amendment
could be read to require preservation of the level of privacy people had when the Bill of Rights was adopted, or perhaps at some
other time. Once again, Professor Kerr has given this suggestion
a particularly thoughtful articulation. "When new tools and new
practices threaten to expand or contract police power," he suggests, courts can and do "adjust the level of Fourth Amendment
protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium ...of privacy
protection"84 and "maintain a balance of police power over
time."85 But the idea neither started nor ended with Kerr, as he
would be the first to acknowledge: his account is explicitly descriptive as well as normative. Kerr's "equilibrium-adjustment
theory" is essentially a generalized version of what Professor
Geoffrey Stone called, forty years ago, "the principle of conservation of privacy."86 The idea, Stone explained, is that "we strive to
maintain a cumulative level of privacy comparable to that existing at the time the [Fourth Amendment] was drafted. 87 Stone's
principle has since been explicitly adopted by the Supreme
Court, which committed itself, at least twice in recent years, to
"assur[ing] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted."88
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Unlike Stone and unlike the Court, Kerr argues that "Year
Zero" need not be 1791.89 But there is no other obvious reference
point.90 And regardless of the starting date, the basic appeal of
this approach remains the same. It avoids the circularity of defining "reasonable expectations of privacy" by reference to the
limits that courts and legislatures place on surveillance, and it
skirts the slippery slope of allowing "reasonable expectations of
privacy" to depend on what people actually have come to expect.
A preexisting balance is fixed and objective. You can hold onto
it.91 "Equilibrium adjustment" therefore can appeal even to people who think privacy is the wrong hook for the Fourth Amendment. Professor Paul Ohm, for example, thinks search-andseizure law needs to adapt to a "world without privacy."92
Borrowing from Kerr, though, he proposes that, as technology
advances, courts should continually adjust Fourth Amendment
burdens on law enforcement, sometimes tightening them and
sometimes loosening them, in order "to preserve a level playing
93
field between the police and criminals."
The argument against this kind of approach to the Fourth
Amendment can be simply stated. It is the same objection, more
or less, that can be raised about originalism. First, other than
determinacy, it has little to recommend it. And second, it doesn't
offer much in the way of determinacy.
To begin with, why would anyone want to "maintain a balance of police power" or "preserve a level playing field between
the police and criminals"? The police and criminals are not
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athletic teams, or separate branches of government that we hope
will keep each other in check. It is not as though there was some
Goldilocks Era when we had just the right amount of crime. It
may seem more plausible to say that there was a time when a
particularly attractive balance-or a balance endorsed by the
Constitution-was struck between the interests of law enforcement on the one hand and the interests of privacy and liberty on
the other. Maybe, in fact, that is how the drafters and adopters
of the Fourth Amendment thought about their own timeminus, of course, general warrants and writs of assistance.
Maybe, but there is little evidence of it. It is hard to find anyone in the eighteenth century singing praises to the exquisite
balance the common law had struck between privacy and law
enforcement. The revolutionary generation often spoke reverentially of the common law, but not in that manner. They extolled
the protections of the common law, not the compromises that it
struck or the social conditions that it fostered.94 There is scant
reason to think that the Fourth Amendment was intended or
originally understood to be a coded instruction to preserve
eighteenth-century levels of privacy, or-even less plausiblythe eighteenth-century balance of power between criminals and
the forces of the state. Nor does that seem an attractive goal to
constitutionalize.
The only reason why it might be attractive has to do with
determinacy. Even if there is nothing especially wonderful about
the eighteenth-century balance between privacy and the interests of law enforcement, perhaps it gives us something to hold
on to-something that will help us avoid making constitutional
protections dependent on what judges happen to find unreasonable, and that will help us to ensure that Fourth Amendment
protections do not dwindle as people come to expect less privacy.
But it doesn't, really. The degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adoptedor at some other point in the past-sounds fixed and objective,
but on closer inspection it proves wildly indeterminate. The
problem is that privacy is neither unidimensional nor evenly
distributed. There are different kinds of privacy, and different
people possess each to different degrees. It is close to meaningless to refer to the "amount," "degree," or "level" of privacy that
existed in 1791 without specifying what is meant by "privacy"
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and whose privacy is at issue. (To avoid complications, I will focus in the argument that follows on the particular version of
"equilibrium adjustment" endorsed by the Supreme Court:
maintaining the level of privacy from state intrusions that existed in 1791. But the basic problems of indeterminacy would remain the same if a different 'Year Zero" were selected, or if we
sought to preserve a 'balance of police power" rather than a
level of privacy.)
To preserve the amount of privacy people had in 1791, we
would need to know what privacy is, or at least roughly how to
measure it. It is a commonplace of modern privacy scholarship,
though, that "[t]here is no such thing as privacy as such";95 rather, privacy is "a plurality of different things,"96 lacking any
'essential' or 'core' characteristics." 97 I find that unconvincing,
but I am in the minority, and even in my view there are at least
two competing conceptions of privacy: a dominant conception of
privacy as control over the dissemination and use of personal information, and a different understanding, which I favor, that
privacy has to do with respect for a zone of personal refuge.98
Nor would choosing one of these two views end the difficulty, because infringements on an individual's right to informational
control are not all mutually commensurable, and neither are violations of a person's zone of refuge. So figuring out whether we
have the same level of privacy today as in the past is not just difficult; it is impossible. The inquiry is incoherent.
Try comparing, for example, the amount of privacy today
with the amount in 1791. And to keep things simple, focus for
the moment just on the privacy of communications. There were
no telephones or computers back then, so no one was susceptible
to wiretapping or e-mail monitoring. And there were no electronic listening devices, either, so if you were alone with someone in
your home or in the secluded corner of a public house, you could
be pretty sure no one would overhear your conversation. There
were no video cameras, and telescopes were bulkier and less
95 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Culturesof Privacy:Dignity versus Liberty,
113 Yale L J 1151, 1221 (2004).
96 Solove, Nothing to Hide at 24 (cited in note 29).
97 Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 8 (Harvard 2008), See also Peter
Galison and Martha Minow, Our Privacy, Ourselves in the Age of Technological Intrusions, in Richard Ashby Wilson, ed, Human Rights in the 'War on Terror' 258, 269
(Cambridge 2005) (describing "privacy" as a term that "evokes a cluster of ideas, rather
than a sharply chiseled concept").
98 See Sklansky, 102 Cal L Rev at 1078-79, 1113 (cited in note 1).
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powerful, so with some care you might be able to know that no
one was watching you, either. On the other hand, precisely because communication technologies were so primitive, there was
no way to speak with anyone without seeing them face-to-face,
and for many people, much of the time, visits of this kind were
difficult to keep secret, especially in communities where people
knew their neighbors. Nor was it always possible to find places
to speak without being overheard. Not every pub had a secluded
corner, and not every person had a spacious home. Telecommunications have opened up new modes of surveillance, but they
have also created new possibilities for discreet interactions. The
same has been true, more recently, of social media, which, despite their "public" nature, allow adolescents "a measure of privacy and autonomy that is not possible at home where parents
and siblings are often listening in."99 Even if we focus just on
privacy from the government, it is not clear whether teenagers,
say, have more or less of it because of social media. Yes, the police can search online records, but they can question parents and
siblings, too, and in some ways that can feel more intrusive. So
is there more privacy today than in 1791, less, or about the
same? It depends how you think about it. And that is without
even considering the privacy of matters other than interpersonal
communications: the privacy of one's medical condition, say, or
the range of intimate behavior that is considered no one else's
business.
What makes things still more complicated is that privacy is
distributed unevenly, and any particular kind of intrusion is
likely to matter more to some people than to others.00 Searches
of homes are of greatest concern to people with homes that are
large, comfortable, uncrowded, and free of domestic violence;
other people tend to carry out less of their lives at home. Searches of cars disproportionately impact people who drive a lot and
people who use their cars for storage. Monitoring of online activity affects people more if they use computers or smartphones
heavily, especially if they live with their parents. Street searches are a particular concern for young men of color, because the
police stop-and-frisk them so often. Airport searches matter
mostly to people who fly, and especially to people-like men of
99 Danah Boyd, It's Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens 19 (Yale
2014).
100 See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo
Wash L Rev 1265, 1272 (1999).
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Middle Eastern extraction-who are disproportionately the objects of DHS suspicion.101
If anything, privacy was even less evenly distributed in the
late eighteenth century, which makes it especially hard and especially senseless to try to preserve the level of privacy that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. There was a
highly pronounced class tilt to common-law protections against
search and seizure. Justice Antonin Scalia has sometimes suggested that a search or seizure should be deemed unconstitutional if "the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth
Amendment" would not have "allowed themselves to be subjected" to it. 102 But it is difficult to identify any kind of government
search or seizure to which those "fiercely proud men" willingly
would have submitted. Searches and seizures of the poor and the
landless, on the other hand, were subject to far fewer
restrictions than today. 103
The revolutionaries objected to searches of their homes and
their persons in part precisely because those searches seemed to
them to violate the protocols of class; they complained that the
customs officers who invaded their houses were "dirty," "insolent," "impertinent," and "rude."104 In this regard, as in others,
Americans echoed the protests in England against the general
warrants executed against John Wilkes and other government
critics. On both sides of the Atlantic, the propertied spokesmen
for the sanctity of the home had nothing to say about searches
and seizures carried out by constables and watchmen-local officials more likely to defer to the gentry, and whose statutory responsibilities, in any event, turned their attention elsewhere.105
The class bias inherent in the unrestricted arrests of "nightwalkers"106 typified the eighteenth-century law of search and
seizure; the wealthy had little occasion to walk public roads after dark. Sir Edward Coke had warned in the seventeenth century that searches allowed against "poore and base people"

101 See generally Ellen Baker, Comment, Flying While Arab-RacialProfiling and
Air Travel Security, 67 J Air L & Comm 1375 (2002).
102 Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia concurring).
103 See Sklansky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1805-06 (cited in note 77).
104 Id at 1805. See also Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 577-78 (cited in note 76). The remainder of this paragraph is adapted from Sklansky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1805-06 (cited
in note 77).
105 See generally William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original
Meaning, 602-1791 (Oxford 2009).
106 See Sklansky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1805 (cited in note 77).
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might later be exercised against others, 107 but his worry was not
widely shared: "English law aimed less at abolishing discretionary intrusions than at confining them within certain social and
occupational boundaries."'' 10 Peers and members of Parliament
received special protections against search and seizure, while
the homes of the poor were freely inspected for vagrants,
poached game, and morals violations.109 Colonial statutes followed the same pattern and added, in the South, the innovation
of the slave patrol: military squads that, operating largely at
night, rounded up drifters and ransacked "Negro Houses" and
other dwellings that might harbor or provide arms to escaped
slaves.1lO
So urging preservation of the amount of privacy that existed
in 1791 is doubly ambiguous: privacy is multidimensional, and it
is unevenly distributed. Asking whether there is more or less
privacy today than in 1791 is close to meaningless without specifying whose privacy and what kind. And it is hard to see how either of those questions can be answered without some underlying ideas about why privacy is valued and, more specifically,
why the Constitution protects privacy. For Fourth Amendment
law, the question is how infringements on privacy can make a
search or seizure "unreasonable." To decide that, we need a
sense of what privacy means and why it matters.

Each of the ideas I have challenged here-the belief that
privacy threats from new technologies are best regulated by legislatures, with minimal judicial involvement, and the notion
that the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment should be anchored in the past--can be understood, in part, as an effort to
keep courts from having to decide what privacy consists of, why
it deserves protection, and how it is threatened. I have my own

107 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Law of England 177
(Clarke 1817).
108 William Cuddihy and B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle:
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 Wm & Mary Q
371, 380 (1980).
109 See id; Cuddihy, The FourthAmendment at 149-50, 164-65 (cited in note 105).
110 See generally Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols:Law and Violence in Virginia and
the Carolinas (Harvard 2001). See also Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the
Framers' Constitution 240 (Macmillan 1988); Cuddihy and Hardy, 37 Wm & Mary Q at
390 (cited in note 108).
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ideas about how to answer those questions,111 but the point I
want to make here is in a way more basic; it is that the questions cannot conscientiously be avoided.
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